Desire - George F. Schueler

Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly
debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two
senses of "desire" are distinguished -- roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes
-- apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can
be seen to be mistaken.

Desire probes a
fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all,
they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason "is
and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held
that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation
of intentional action. G.F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in
various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual
belief-desire accounts need to be replaced.

Schueler contends that
the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure
to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro
attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as
desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a
different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of
action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant
considerations and that these may not include desires proper at
all.

A Bradford Book